

JPRS 82509

21 December 1982

# Worldwide Report

NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION

No. 172



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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# WORLDWIDE REPORT

## NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION

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FINLAND INTERESTED IN COOPERATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA ON PLANT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Nov 82 p 25

[Article: "Yugoslavia's Nuclear Power Project Interests Finns"]

[Text] The Finns are especially interested in participating in the delivery of a nuclear power plant to Yugoslavia. Thus stated Director Anders Palmgren of Imatra Power in acquainting Vidoje Zarkovich, member of Yugoslavia's Presidential Council, and his group with the Lovisa Nuclear Power Plant on Thursday. Yugoslavia is interested in procuring a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant.

The discussions with the Finns and other possible suppliers are just in the initial stage, emphasized Director Palmgren. The price of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant at the present price level will be a full 5 billion markkas.

At present there is one nuclear power plant in Yugoslavia and plans call for the construction of several more units.

Finnish industry is considered to have the prerequisites for participating in the possible delivery of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant. Imatra Power is just now completing a report together with the Soviet Union on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt power plant patterned after Lovisa.

The Soviet export organization Atomenergoeksport would deliver the plant reactor and nuclear equipment and Finnish industry would manufacture the structural engineering parts and control systems or approximately 70 percent of the whole project.

Imatra Power and Finnish industry are technically very well prepared to deliver the major parts of a unit developed on the basis of Lovisa's 440-megawatt reactors.

The readiness to participate in the delivery of a 1,000-megawatt unit is based on a projected study of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant conducted together with Atomenergoeksport, which has determined the distribution of work on a possible project and the technical facilities of the plant as well as the enterprises that would participate in it.

The Finns have acquired experience in the construction of nuclear plants from their construction of Imatra Power's two 440-megawatt units at Lovisa and the 660-megawatt unit at Olkiluoto. The domestic level in the construction of Lovisa I and II was approximately two-thirds.

Imatra Power has conducted negotiations for the joint deliveries of plants to several countries on the basis of the experience gained from Lovisa. Negotiations progressed the furthest with Libya, but the project fell through anyway. The company is still actively searching out nuclear power markets and in addition to Yugoslavia, a couple other Mediterranean countries have expressed interest as possible clients.

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CSD: 5100/2514

# U.S. BASE'S ROLE AS SOVIET MISSILE TARGET EXAMINED

Canberra THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN in English 23-24 Oct 82 pp 1, 4

[Article by William Pinwill]

[Text]

A SECRET Pentagon report compiled last year warns that the Russians may decide to demolish the satellite ground station at Nurrungar, near Woomera, with a nuclear missile, before they launch any missiles against the continental United States.

When the Australian Defence Department heard about the report, it sought a copy from the Pentagon. But the section of the document that deals with the Soviet threat to Nurrungar was classified TOP SECRET-NOFORN.

This American acronym for "no foreign" means it cannot be read by foreign governments — including, in this case, the Government which hosts the "joint facility" at Woomera.

More than a year after the report, "Satellite Mission Survivability Study", was written, the Defence Department in Canberra had still not received a copy.

Official Australian ignorance about the Nurrungar station dates from its inception.

When the Gorton government decided to grant the US rights to build the joint defence space communications station at Woomera in 1968, Sir Allen Fairhall, the Minister for Defence, told a press conference: "It is a navigational aid."

It would be run, he said, by "civilians, as far as I know".

"The functioning of the station will make a contribution to Free World defence — but I wish you wouldn't ask me how," the Australian defence minister declared.

"We are approving the purpose of this, but as to what equipment is needed to fulfil that purpose, really I don't know."

Sir Allen was asked: "Is this type of installation, sir, one which would acquire defensive measures in the event of major international tension?"

He replied: "I don't see why. Of course, the more way-out will immediately brand this a nuclear target."

Apart from the now publicly-known facts that Nurrungar has nothing to do with "navigation" and it is run by the US Air Force, the "more way-out" now include the US Department of Defence, the authors of the Satellite Mission Survivability Study which Canberra is not allowed to read.

American sources familiar with the Pentagon study say it assumes that any large-scale use of nuclear weapons by the Soviets would involve a comprehensive attack against all US military targets.

But a vital part of the US command and control system is the innocuously named defence support program, also called Code 647, which provides early warning of Soviet

attack by detecting missile firings shortly after lift-off.

Code 647 operates through three satellites and two ground stations, one at Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado, the other at Nurrungar.

The Pentagon acknowledges that the ground stations are much more vulnerable than the satellites, and Code 647 is a particularly fragile system because of its dependence on only two earth links. (Work is proceeding on the development of "mobile ground terminals" to be deployed around the US, but these are not yet operational.)

## Capability

The Satellite Mission Survivability Study points out that if the Soviet Union wanted to avoid the political and strategic consequences of a nuclear attack on American territory, it may choose to strike Woomera rather than Colorado.

It argues that such a move would demonstrate Moscow's resolve and capability.

This possibility has never been publicly canvassed by either Washington or Canberra. The Australian Government's reassuring public view has always been that the US facilities here — Nurrungar, Pine Gap and North West Cape — do not constitute any particular threat to Australia.

"The Government does not believe that any individual target in Australia would be singled out for nuclear attack in any situation short of a global nuclear war - the ultimate catastrophe which the Government's policy of co-operation with trusted, peace-loving allies would assist in preventing," Mr David Fairbairn, Minister for Defence, told the House of Representatives on September 14 1971.

This report by the Katter committee, *Threats To Australia's Security*, raises several challenging questions about Nurrungar and Pine Gap.

Despite a pledge by the Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, that the Government would respond to all parliamentary committee reports within six months of their tabling, it is now 11 months since the Katter report and there has been only silence from the Minister and Department of Defence.

One of the problems facing the defence authorities is that neither the US nor Australian government has even described the real functions of Nurrungar.

They have abided by the myth of its deceptive name, the joint defence space communications station, and have never even acknowledged its role in the early warning system.

A small crack in this facade appeared this week when the visiting head of the US Air Force Space Command, General Hartinger, inadvertently referred to Nurrungar as a "sensor site".

But successive governments in Canberra, including the Whitlam government, have refused to go beyond saying it is for "communications", adding that a more detailed description of its role would negate its value.

The absurdity of this proposition is that the Soviet Union is well aware of the functions of Nurrungar and the US Defence Support Program, because it plays an integral part in the Strategic Arms Limitation arrangements negotiated between the two superpowers.

The satellite reconnaissance systems operated by both countries are given the euphemism "national technical means of verification".

The infra-red detectors on the Code 647 satellites can detect underground missile silos because of the difference in temperature between them and the surrounding earth, and they can "see" inside buildings.

By this means, the US is able to verify whether the Soviets are keeping to the missile limitations agreed under SALT.

Until recently, both sides avoided public mention of "spy satellites", but both former President Carter and Mr Brezhnev have now made public reference to them.

## Experience

On November 3 last year, Radio Moscow quoted Mr Brezhnev as saying: "Just as the United States, so the Soviet Union has experience of controlling the SALT I accords. It's positive that the national technical means can ensure appropriate control. The resulting power of observation systems - space observation systems in particular - is constantly growing."

Although this was the first public acknowledgment of spy satellites by the Soviets, details of the systems have been available for years in US technical and strategic journals.

The functions of Nurrungar and Pine Gap are also fully described in a book by Australian strategic analyst Dr Des Ball, *A Suitable Piece Of Real Estate*.

It seems that Nurrungar's role in verifying the SALT accords is the main justification used by the US and Australian defence authorities in their confidential briefings of Australian politicians.

The Leader of the Opposition, Mr Hayden, has said that Nurrungar contributes to world peace by its role in verifying the arms limitation agreements between the superpowers.

He defends the presence of the station here as a "stabilising" influence in the superpower relationship. The point which no Australian politician has addressed is that Nurrungar also has a nuclear war-fighting capability.

## Instantaneous

Each of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile sites is on the US target list.

The infra-red telescope on the Code 647 satellite in geostationary orbit some 40,000km over the eastern hemisphere detects the ignition of any ICBM engine and "photographs" its rocket plumes for about the first minute of its flight.

This intelligence is transmitted in "real-time", i.e. instantaneously, via

Nurrungar to the US national command, at which point the American missiles targeted on that particular Soviet silo can be re-directed at another ICBM site.

In any controlled nuclear exchange, Nurrungar plays a vital part in US missile strategy, which explains why the Pentagon acknowledges it would constitute a desirable target for the Russians.

The joint defence space communications station is an integral part of the US system of "command, control and communications" known to strategic planners as C<sup>3</sup>.

A leading Western analyst, Uri Ra'anani, wrote in September 1981: "The publications of Soviet military theoreticians and planners stress the need for paralysing the adversary's C<sup>3</sup> system in the opening stage, obviously not sharing the preoccupation of Western analysts with the thought that functioning C<sup>3</sup> systems would be required to enable both sides to negotiate a halt in an escalatory process."

CSO: 5100/7512

## W. AUSTRALIA ABANDONS PLANS FOR NUCLEAR POWER STATION

Canberra THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN in English 6-7 Nov 82 p 6

[Article by Peter Terry]

[Text]

WESTERN Australia is scrapping its controversial plan to have the country's first nuclear power station operating by the 1990s.

For the project to have gone ahead, a final decision would have been necessary within the next three years.

But the State is now estimating it will have more than enough conventional power to last into the next century.

The State Minister for Fuel and Energy, Mr Jones, told *The Australian* of the decision yesterday.

But he made it clear that the State will continue to maintain a watching brief on nuclear power station developments, and that it will make a new bid to have the country's proposed nuclear enrichment plant built in the west.

Mr Jones said even though the recent Federal Government-sponsored inquiry had suggested South Australia and Queensland as possible sites for the enrichment plant, there was no doubt Western Australia was a real contender.

If Labor won the South Australian election, Western Australia would make it clear that it still wanted to be considered for the multi-million dollar facility.

Mr Jones was speaking after a Perth seminar organised to detail the State Government's future energy policy.

Mr Jones told more than 800 delegates that in the past three years the State's energy prospects had changed dramatically.

New finds of coal and gas were ending its reliance on oil imports so much that with natural gas it was heading to become a major energy exporter.

### Processing

Its coal reserves were now sufficient for generating electric power well into the next century.

As late as 1979, the State had not been in a position to offer ready supplies of energy that would attract new processing industries.

"Now we can look ahead to attracting a wide variety of processing industries for mineral and agricultural products," said Mr Jones.

He said later the Government would now be pressing hard to attract new industry.

It had already established a joint research group with the partners in the North West Shelf natural gas project to investigate the development of mineral processing plants in the North of the State to take advantage of the ready supply of gas.

"In our view, Karratha will form the centre of a new area for industrial processing," said Mr Jones.

Karratha is now the construction centre for the offshore gas fields.

When the construction phase is completed the town's population could fall dramatically, unless new industry is introduced.

"It is quite possible that we could have a petro-chemical plant up there," said Mr Jones.

"The only real limiting factor is the high labor costs in the north.

"We want industry up there, but the town will sink back again to a small population if wages do not go down after the shell construction."

## SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY SPLIT ON URANIUM MINING

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 2 Nov 82 p 3

[Text] ANY assurance the South Australian Opposition Leader, Mr Bannon, had given that the Roxby Downs uranium-mineral project would go ahead under a Labor government was worthless without official confirmation from the Left, the Premier, Mr Tonkin, said yesterday.

His claim follows a reported statement at the weekend by the ALP member for Elimbeth, Mr Peter Duncan, that the party's rank and file was "stewing" over the policy statement by Mr Bannon that the controversial development would go ahead under Labor.

Mr Tonkin, claiming there was a critical rift in the State party, said yesterday: "There is now only one person who can give a worthwhile guarantee that Roxby Downs would proceed under a Labor government — and that is Peter Duncan."

Mr Duncan, a prominent left-winger and member of Labor's federal executive, has been one of the most outspoken critics of the softening of ALP policy on uranium.

Mr Tonkin said Mr Bannon, afraid for his party's chances in Saturday's State election, was desperately trying to cover up the bitterness of the faction fighting over uranium.

"The uranium question has got to be answered — and clearly Mr Bannon cannot now speak on behalf of the party as a whole," Mr Tonkin said.

"Without a guarantee from Mr Duncan, the public must assume the future of Roxby

Downs under a Labor government is severely jeopardised."

The Premier issued a series of questions on major electoral issues to the Opposition yesterday demanding that Mr Bannon answer them before the election.

These included a call for a guarantee that Labor would now make it possible for the \$1460 million Roxby Downs project to proceed and a query as to when Labor Party faction fighting on the issue would end.

Mr Tonkin also asked when Labor would close the Honey-moon and Beverley uranium mines now in final pre-production stages.

In a brief statement issued from Whyalla, where Mr Bannon was campaigning yesterday, the Opposition leader said the change of policy that enabled support for Roxby Downs had been discussed at all levels of the party.

There had been many opportunities for State ALP members to dispute the policy, but this had not occurred, Mr Bannon said.

The Opposition spokesman on the Attorney-General's affairs, Mr Christopher Sumner, moved quickly to reaffirm ALP support for Roxby Downs yesterday.

He said the party had accepted the legality of the Roxby Downs Indenture Bill and was resolved to stand by the agreement passed in Parliament earlier this year.

"These allegations are the sort of thing one can expect from the Liberals at this stage of the campaign," Mr Sumner said.

"They are on the rocks and desperate to find an issue — our national conference in July made it clear that Labor policy would see Roxby Downs go ahead."

Mr Tonkin said the federal ALP policy adopted in July gave the Opposition options on uranium.

The question of whether this was actually a softening of the ALP stance on uranium was "a matter of interpretation".

Mr Sumner admitted Labor would seek amendments to the bill, but stressed this would only occur if the exploration partners agreed to the changes Labor proposed.

He described as "total rubbish" a claim by the Minister for Mines and Energy, Mr Goldsworthy, that a Labor government would not even wait for the party's next State conference in June before reneging on the Roxby Downs agreement.

Mr Goldsworthy said Mr Duncan's reported statement "gives the lie to the sham the Labor Party is perpetrating".

It was clear evidence of a deep division in the party over uranium and indicated Mr Bannon might not be able to stem the tide of anti-uranium feeling from the ALP Left if Labor came to power.

"The rank and file determine Labor Party policy, not the parliamentary leader," Mr Goldsworthy said.

The rank and file in South Australia had initiated the ALP's uranium policy in 1977 and remained strongly committed to preventing the uranium industry from going ahead.

# JOCKEYING OVER URANIUM ENRICHMENT SITE CONTINUES

## Northern Territory Overtures

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 19 Oct 82 p 11

[Article by Sharon Flanagan]

[Text]

THE Northern Territory is competing with South Australia and Queensland for the right to build Australia's first uranium enrichment plant.

This is despite the Federal Government's acceptance earlier this month of a recommendation by the Uranium Enrichment Group of Australia (UEGA) that sites near Brisbane and Adelaide should be the first examined.

In the Territory's bid to win the sought-after plant - which would cost about \$1000 million and provide about 2000 jobs - its Minister for Mines and Energy, Mr Tuxworth, is pursuing talks with potential Japanese and Korean partners.

This follows the Federal Government's surprise acceptance of the UEGA proposal that foreign interests be offered up to 80 per cent equity in any uranium enrichment project, instead of the maximum

25 per cent laid down for uranium mining.

"When I was in Japan and Korea late last month, Japanese and Korean interests - both at a government and private level - expressed interest in the enrichment proposal," Mr Tuxworth said yesterday.

"I believe their participation is an important part of the equation."

The Chief Minister (Mr Everingham) has directed me to follow up my initial discussions in this area and I am about to do that.

"There is no doubt there is interest in these countries in our enrichment proposals."

Mr Tuxworth said a big advantage which the NT had over other parts of Australia was the strong support which existed there for the uranium industry.

"The Territory Government's view is that anybody

intending to build an enrichment plant without acceptance of the local community would be making a mistake."

The recent experience with construction of the Omega station in Victoria is a clear indication of how projects can be delayed and how their costs can be escalated when there is no community support for the concept.

"There is support for the uranium industry in the NT. It runs at about 75 per cent acceptance and I believe this factor has not been addressed sufficiently by UEGA."

"While we may lack infrastructure and while construction costs are high in the Territory, ultimately it could be much less expensive and much less disruptive to use the Territory as a site for the enrichment plant."

## South Australian Bid

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 20 Oct 82 p 2

[Article by John Stanton]

[Text]

A JOINT federal-State committee will prepare an indenture agreement for a \$1000 million uranium enrichment plant to be established in South Australia.

The Federal Minister for National Development and Energy, Senator Carrick,

has committed the Commonwealth to help lay the groundwork for the plant.

The indenture agreement should be completed by mid-1983, paving the way for construction of the plant provided the State Government is re-elected on November 6

and South Australia gains federal approval to establish the enrichment industry.

The State Minister for Mines and Energy, Mr Goldsworthy, said yesterday the South Australian Uranium Enrichment Committee had established a good working relationship with the Uranium Enrichment Group of Australia, which recently recommended South Australia and Queensland as the preferred sites for a uranium enrichment industry.

Mr Goldsworthy said federal assistance in drawing up the agreement was "a major step forward" in the State's bid to establish the lucrative industry.

He said an enrichment plant would employ about 2000 workers and would greatly enhance South Australia's advanced technology capacity.

Negotiations for the indenture will cover acquisition of land for the plant, discussions

on possible sites, provision of the large amounts of power needed to run the plant, and adherence to strict nuclear safety guidelines.

The negotiation of the indenture for the Roxby Downs copper-uranium-rare metals project, similar in cost to the enrichment plant, took about a year to complete.

The South Australian Government has been active in pushing its case for the enrichment plant site ahead of the other contender, Queensland.

The Premier, Mr Tonkin, flew to Canberra last weekend for discussions with the Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, on the topic.

Executives of the Urenco-Centec centrifuge enrichment technology consortium will fly from Europe within a fortnight for discussions in Adelaide aimed at selecting possible sites for the plant.

### Public Say in Queensland

Brisbane THE COURIER-MAIL in English 20 Oct 82 p 10

[Text]

Mr Bjelke-Petersen said in State Parliament last week that the plant needed to be located near large centres to supply skilled labor and engineering support.

The Energy Minister, Mr Gibbs, this week called for rational debate over the future of the Australian enrichment industry.

Mr Gibbs said: "It seems that some people are prepared to oppose anything with the word uranium in its make-up without giving proper thought to the subject."

"The critics within Australia seem to ignore that enriched

uranium is already being used in several hundred nuclear power stations in many countries."

A decision on the plant was two to three years away. Meanwhile people should acquaint themselves with the facts, he said.

Residents of near-Brisbane areas suggested as sites for a uranium enrichment plant would be given "adequate" chance for talks before a decision was made.

The Deputy Premier, Dr Edwards, speaking for the Premier, Mr Bjelke-Petersen, told State Parliament this yesterday.

He said no specific site had been selected.

He told the Deputy Opposition Leader, Mr D'Arcy, a number of possible sites near Brisbane and Adelaide had been considered on a "notional" basis to test technology requirements.

The State Government had liaised with the Federal Government and the Uranium Enrichment Group of Australia for a number of years over plans to establish an enrichment industry, Dr Edwards said.

Caboorture and Beaudesert are two of the three areas believed to be under consideration.

### Queensland Union Opposition

Brisbane THE COURIER-MAIL in English 21 Oct 82 p 9

[Text]

ALL Queensland Trades and Labor Council unions will co-operate with the council to prevent the planning and construction of any uranium enrichment plant in Queensland.

The TLC general secretary, Mr Fred Whitby, said this was decided at a TLC meeting last night.

The council was concerned with the unsolved economic, social, bio-

logical, genetic, environmental and technical problems associated with the mining and enrichment of uranium and development of nuclear power.

Mr Whitby said the council felt the nuclear power industry was a proven contributor to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and increased risk of nuclear war.

There was also the absence of procedures for the storage and dis-

posal of radioactive waste which ensured that any danger to human life and environment was eliminated.

"It is imperative that no commitment of Australia's uranium deposits to the world's nuclear fuel cycle be made until we are satisfied that these problems have been resolved.

"As no developments have occurred that would justify a retreat from the existing policy, the Trades

and Labor Council reiterates its position of unequivocal opposition to the mining and export of uranium and the present program of develop-

ment, including the proposed establishment of a uranium enrichment plant anywhere in Australia," Mr Whitby said.

The unions completely opposed proposals for the construction of an uranium enrichment plant in Queensland.

## Dispute in South

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 28 Oct 87 p 3

[Article by Geoff Sorby and John Stanton]

[Text] THE possible development of a uranium enrichment industry in South Australia emerged as a vital State election issue in federal Parliament and the State yesterday.

Charges by the federal Opposition inside and outside Parliament that consortiums investigating the possibility of an enrichment plant had reneged on the deal were hotly denied by the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Anthony, the State Premier, Mr Tonkin, and the federal Minister for National Development and Resources and Energy, Senator Sir John Carrick.

The verbal brawl was sparked by a letter from the Australian sector of the consortium, the Uranium Enrichment Group of Australia, stating that they, along with their European partners, Urenco-Centec, were only undertaking a world-wide market survey before deciding on building an enrichment plant in either South Australia or Brisbane.

Mr Anthony said yesterday UEGA had advised the Federal Government a decision to proceed with a detailed engi-

neering and feasibility study, expected to take at least two years, would depend on the outcome of a market survey, which would take at least six months.

The Opposition made its charge after the spokesman for the environment and conservation, Mr Stewart West (NSW), had received a letter from the chairman of UEGA, Mr K. F. Herbert.

In his letter, Mr Herbert said:

"UEGA is not proposing at this time to proceed with the construction of an enrichment plant in Australia, nor even with a detailed feasibility study."

### Survey

"Whether or not a detailed feasibility study is undertaken in the near future will depend on our joint assessment, with Urenco-Centec, of the extent and timing of future markets."

He said any decision to proceed with construction of a uranium enrichment plant would be subject to thorough study, including an environmental impact statement.

Mr Tonkin emphasised last night there was nothing new in Mr Herbert's letter, and said it did not alter the State's commitment to gaining the rights to establish a uranium enrichment industry.

"There was never any suggestion that construction of the plant was being considered at this time," Mr Tonkin said.

Mr Tonkin said the time frame of negotiations provided for possible construction of an enrichment plant to begin about 1988. The plant was never intended to come fully on-line until the end of the decade.

"The next decision to be made is one of site, which will be made within about 18 months by Urenco-Centec and UEGA, working in conjunction with the South Australian and Queensland governments," he said.

Only after a site had been fixed would a detailed feasibility study be entered into.

A market survey of world demand for enriched uranium would run concurrently with the feasibility study.

CSO: 5100/7510

## ENERGY RESOURCES LTD ASSESSES URANIUM MARKETING SITUATION

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 22 Oct 82 p 14

[Article by Ian Perkin]

[Text] A REDUCTION in the Federal Government's \$30 a pound minimum export price for Australian uranium would not necessarily lead to Energy Resources of Australia Ltd (ERA) making any additional sales on the world market.

Group chairman, Mr Alex Morokoff, told the annual meeting in Sydney yesterday the company was actively seeking new contracts for its uranium production from the Ranger mine in the Northern Territory.

But he said the company was not interested in making sales at any price.

The meeting was remarkable for its lack of disruption. Although security around the venue — Sydney's Masonic Centre — was tight, there were no signs of anti-nuclear demonstrations that have plagued other meetings.

Answering a question from a shareholder, Mr Kerry O'Halloran, about the impact of the Government's minimum price, Mr Morokoff said the spot market for uranium world-wide was depressed and well below the minimum government price.

But he pointed out the spot market made up only a small proportion of total world-wide sales — perhaps 10 to 15 per cent of the uranium sold throughout the world each year.

"If spot prices become attractive — and that means reasonable prices — then the spot market could become attractive to us," he said.

"But we are not in the business of giving away our product. In-

cremental tonnage is a very attractive proposition to us, but not at any expense."

In recent months, the spot price has fallen well below the minimum Federal government export price of \$30 — with substantial sales in the \$20 to \$23 a pound range, and some even reported as low as \$17 a pound.

Although there has been some criticism of the Government's \$30 a pound minimum price, it would be ridiculous for any company seeking long-term contracts at high prices to want to sell on the spot market as well.

Spot sales at present world levels would only defeat the purpose of contractual negotiations — longer term sales contracts above the minimum price set by the Government.

Mr Morokoff said yesterday ERA's own effort to find additional markets for uranium were continuing with encouraging responses.

"Our marketing team has a busy year ahead and we are confident that it will meet with success in due course," he said.

"We believe this confidence is well founded.

"Despite the general downturn in the economies of the principal Western nations, the number of nuclear power stations in operation and being built continues to grow, as does the proportion of total electric power generated by nuclear energy.

"It follows that in the foreseeable future the demand for uranium will increase."

### Sales

Mr Morokoff said one of the factors favoring nuclear power

and the future for uranium sales was that uranium used as fuel to generate power represented only about 10 per cent of total operations costs of a power station.

Coal, on the other hand, makes up about 80 per cent of the operating costs of coal-fired stations.

"This means, of course, that fluctuations in uranium prices have relatively little bearing on the economics of building or operating nuclear power stations," he said.

Mr Morokoff said he believed ERA was well placed to serve additional uranium markets because of its already established position as a dependable supplier.

"This is why we are confident that with persistence we will find additional markets to capitalise on our ability to produce above design capacity," he said.

Mr Morokoff said ERA — which made a profit of \$38 million from its first nine months of operations last year — said that Ranger had been proven as an efficient operation and this had continued into the new year.

Production in the first quarter of this year was at an annualised rate of 3216 tonnes, but the plant has proven that it can produce at a much higher rate — up to 3800 tonnes annually — if and when additional production is required.

Mr Morokoff suggested production from the Ranger mine could even be doubled relatively quickly and inexpensively if market and sales conditions warranted.

Asked if the company was concerned at the prospect of a Labor government in the immediate future, Mr Morokoff said the company had kept in touch with all interest groups, including the ALP.

He said the Opposition spokesman for minerals and energy, Mr Paul Keating, had visited the Ranger mine site in the last two weeks.

Mr Morokoff could not give any cast-iron guarantees about the future of ERA's existing contracts, but indicated the company's special relationship with its customer-shareholders would work in its favor.

He said with iron ore and coal producers under pressure, it would be natural for ERA's shareholders to question the security of its own long-term contracts, all of which were negotiated before the uranium market turned down.

"The manner in which this company has been structured must surely place it in a rather special position," he said.

"There are not many companies whose main customers are its equity-holders and in some instances also its financiers.

"While I would not like to over-emphasise their significance there is no doubt that the relationships which exist with our biggest customers have the effect of producing a very stable business environment."

CSO: 5100/7510

# FRENCH AIRLINE PICKETED OVER PACIFIC A-TEST CONTAMINATION

Melbourne THE AGE in English 2 Nov 82 p 10

[Article by Rosslyn Beeby]

[Text] Radiation contamination from French nuclear tests was causing horrific birth deformities among Pacific Islanders, an anti-nuclear activist, Ms Lorraine Ethel, claimed yesterday.

Skin and brain cancers and leukaemia had also increased dramatically among Pacific Islanders, she said.

Ms Ethel, who sailed to the Mururoa Atoll test zone last year on the anti-nuclear protest yacht Pacific Peacemaker, was in Melbourne yesterday to open officially a picket against UTA, the French Government-owned airline.

Ms Ethel condemned UTA's promotion of "Pacific paradise" holiday flights as immoral. The Mitterrand Government last month announced it would step up its nuclear weapons programme by 18 per cent, which would lead to increased weapons testing in the Pacific, she said.

"It is blatant hypocrisy for UTA to offer trips to a so-called Pacific paradise when nuclear tests conducted by the French Government are responsible for massive health problems among the Pacific Islanders," Ms Ethel said.

Members of peace groups, unions and church organisations are picketing the airline's offices in Collins Street as a protest against continued French nuclear testing in the Pacific. A spokesman for People for Nuclear Disarmament said yesterday that protest deputations would also be sent to the French Embassy, and to the Department of Foreign Affairs. A rally will be held outside UTA's offices at noon on Friday.

Ms Ethel said that during the Pacific Peacemaker's visit to the islands, she had been told repeatedly by islanders of the increase in radiation-related diseases. These included gross birth deformities, respiratory diseases, thyroid cancer and ciguatera — a nervous disease transmitted from radiation-contaminated fish.

A spokesman for People for Nuclear Disarmament, Mr Michael Hamel-Green, said UTA was the airline which had flown French legionnaires to Mururoa to establish the testing base in 1964.

The manager of Melbourne's UTA office, Mr Mark Hau, said yesterday that UTA was not at liberty to comment on the policy of the French Government.

CSO: 5100/7511

BRIEFS

OMEGA ANTI-NUCLEAR PROTEST--Anti-nuclear protesters will demonstrate outside the Omega navigation tower base in Gippsland, Victoria, this afternoon at the same time as the federal Minister for Transport and Construction, Mr Hunt, officially opens the project. The convenor of People for Nuclear Disarmament, Mr Richard Tanter, said yesterday that "symbolic activities" would be staged outside the base, 250km south-east of Melbourne, as part of a campaign aimed at closing Omega. "We believe Omega contributes to an increased risk of nuclear war and, as a possible nuclear target, it endangers the lives of many Victorians," Mr Tanter said. He said the protest would draw attention to Omega's capability of providing navigation for attacks by nuclear-armed submarines. The group intended to increase awareness of Omega's role in the Federal Government plans to "link Australia into the war-fighting plans of the major powers". Mr Tanter said it was "deeply disturbing" that the head of the US Space Command, Lieutenant-General James Hartinger, was visiting Australia "to upgrade the role of the Nurrungar base in space warfare". [Text] [Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 22 Oct 82 p 2]

ROXBY DOWNS POTENTIAL--The economic benefits of the Roxby Downs project in South Australia will be enormous, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Anthony, said. He was replying at Question Time to Mr Steele Hall (Lib, SA), who had asked if he was aware of the project's export potential. Mr Anthony warned that the project would not be viable if its uranium deposits were not mined. He hoped South Australians would take into account the likely effect on the project if they voted unwisely for a Labor Government in the November 6 State elections. He said the deposit contained at least 2000 million tonnes of mineralised matter. Its capital cost in 1981 terms would be \$1400 million. Its prospective annual production was 150,000 tonnes of copper, 3000 tonnes of uranium oxide, 3400kg of gold and up to 23,000kg of silver. The annual value of its output could be between \$442 million and \$658 million. It would have a production workforce of 2400 and generate total employment of between 5700 and 8300. The construction workforce for the project would be between 9300 and 18,600, counting both direct and indirect employment. [Text] [Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 22 Oct 82 p 4]

RADIOACTIVE DUMP SEARCH--The Victorian Government is looking for somewhere to store radioactive wastes as an alternative to a basement in a building at Treasury Place. Although the material, left over from the treatment of cancer patients at some Melbourne hospitals, is in lead-clad containers, the Premier, Mr Cain, said yesterday that a search was being conducted to find a more suitable location. The general secretary of the Victorial Public Service Association, Mr Monty Burgess, said yesterday that independent tests ordered by Mr Cain had shown the radioactive stores were not a health hazard. But a report by the radiation protection officer at Melbourne University indicated that the storage area—a basement in the Government Printing Office—was not suitable for the storage of the waste. [Text] [Melbourne THE AGE in English 6 Nov 82 p 15]

CSO: 5100/7512

## INDIA CALLS FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT CONVENTION

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 17 Nov 82 p 3

[Text] United Nations, Nov 16 (PTI)—Nearly a score of countries have joined India in tabling a draft resolution before the UN Political and Security Committee proposing an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Presenting the resolution to the committee yesterday the Indian delegate Dr Cheranjit Chanana, said the international community must consider effective measures for the prevention of nuclear war along with nuclear disarmament as matters of the 'highest priority'.

Dr Chanana clarified that the draft convention proposed in the resolution while serving as a basis for negotiations did not and was not intended to preclude consideration in the Geneva disarmament to achieve the same objective.

In proposing the convention, India and other co-sponsors were encouraged by the affirmative vote cast by two nuclear weapon States the Soviet Union and China on a resolution adopted by the General Assembly last year on the non use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, Dr Chanana said.

The co-sponsors to the resolution introduced by Dr Chanana were Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cyprus, Ecuador Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana Indonesia, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mali Nigeria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

## Concrete Steps

Dr Chanana recalled that India had submitted to the second special session on disarmament earlier this year the text of a possible draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. It had hoped that in view of the unprecedented surge of public anxiety all over the world over the increasing danger of the outbreak of a catastrophic nuclear war and the rising tide of popular opposition to nuclear weapons, the special session would have adopted concrete measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament.

However that did not prove to be possible and India's proposal was transmitted to the current session of the General Assembly for consideration.

Dr Chanana said the revised draft he had introduced contained a new preambular paragraph in order to make it clear that the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons was not an end in itself, but rather a step towards total nuclear disarmament and ultimate general and complete disarmament.

The first and foremost task of the present time was to ensure the survival of mankind which was threatened by the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war. The suggestions of the co-sponsors were in line with the approach adopted by the final document of the special session.

Dr Chanana said it was necessary that the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament be enabled to undertake negotiations with a view to prohibiting the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

Since the survival of mankind was involved all States had a vital interest in the matter and therefore multilateral negotiation of an agreement on that subject would be both appropriate and indispensable, the Indian delegate said.

The Political and Security Committee now has a total of 21 draft resolutions before it on a number of disarmament related agenda items.

CSO: 5100/7028

## NUCLEAR ENERGY PLANS DEEMED 'UNREALISTIC'

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 9 Nov 82 p 8

[Editorial: "Atomic Ambitions"]

[Text] The Prime Minister is said to have told the parliamentary consultative committee for atomic energy of efforts to raise the country's nuclear power capacity from 860 MW at present to about 10,000 MW by the end of this century. Nothing could be more suggestive of a drift in the atomic power programme than periodic references to such unrealistic plans. Mrs Gandhi may not have mentioned any firm target, but what is apparently being attempted must have been considered feasible or likely. The record so far makes any such expectation entirely meaningless. The late Dr Vikram Sarabhai had drawn a "profile" of growth for the seventies; if that vision had been translated into reality, India would have had a total nuclear power capacity of 2,700 MW three years ago. Nothing came of the high ambition, but that did not deter the atomic planners from carrying out another exercise in growth projection. The 10,000 MW target to be reached by 2000 A.D. was first mentioned in 1980; all that has happened since is that the time for execution has been reduced from 20 years to 17 years. The two stations which were under construction in 1980, at Kalpakkam and Narora, are still at that stage. Some progress has undoubtedly been made with both, but it is not difficult to estimate what will be achieved at this pace in another 17 years.

The pace can, in theory, be greatly accelerated, but the scene cannot be miraculously transformed. Even a substantial improvement cannot be expected with any degree of certainty. Every atomic project has been inordinately delayed, and deadlines have gone on being revised. In 1980, after several revisions of target date, the first unit at Kalpakkam was scheduled to be commissioned in a year's time; but even that has not been accomplished. Nor has work begun on the two new stations decided upon more than two years ago. It took about 14 years to complete the second unit at Rajasthan; 15 years have already been spent on the first at Kalpakkam. These units are of a little over 200 MW each, and what is being talked about is installation of around 9,000 MW of new capacity in the next 17 years. Even if the atomic energy authorities are not embarrassed, by the absurdity of it all, the Prime Minister should have declined to follow their brief in projecting the future. In fact they should be strictly instructed not to make any projection at all and concentrate instead on the tasks in hand. It would be far more useful to find out why the projects under way are making so little progress than to draw up plans which have become increasingly irrelevant.

## BRIEFS

**NUCLEAR ENERGY SEMINAR**—Participants at a seminar on nuclear energy in the Capital on Friday recommended that "an independent review committee be set up to consider India's ambitious nuclear energy programme", reports PTI. A majority of the speakers at a one day seminar organised by a committee for a Nuclear Policy felt India does not have the knowhow and the capacity to achieve the target of 10,000 MW by 2,000 as set out by the Prime Minister recently. The target would require 20,000 tonnes of heavy water and an investment of Rs 35,000 crore in 20 years, which was beyond the country's means. Dr B D Nag Chaudhuri, eminent scientist, Mr K C Pant Mr P Ramamurthy, Syed Shahabuddin and Dr Bhai Mahavir, all members of Parliament were among those who took part in the seminar. Speakers felt that there had been a lack of information, mismanagement of nuclear programmes and constantly misleading statements from the Government all of which highlighted the need for a review committee. Dr Nag Chaudhuri said the need for the hour was a critical appraisal of the failures in the scientific realm. If the successes alone were publicised the people would tend to disbelieve even the real accomplishments, he added. [Text] [New Delhi PATRIOT in English 13 Nov 82 p 10]

CSO: 5100/7027

## PAPER COMMENTS ON U.S. ATTITUDES

GFO20526 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 27 Nov 82 p 4

[Editorial: "Nuclear Duplicity"]

[Text] President Zia has clearly stated in the course of an interview he gave the other day to UPI that if the U.S. continues to accord discriminatory treatment to Pakistan and seeks to impose tougher inspection of Pakistan's nuclear facilities, he would resist pressure on this point from Washington. He has cited the examples of India, Israel, Japan, South Africa and Brazil which have a nuclear potential but are not pressurised and Pakistan has been singled out for a more rigid scrutiny of its installations. He has said that if American policy were to make no distinction and treat all countries alike, Islamabad would accept even greater safeguards than those applied to its favoured few, and expressed the hope the American objections to the development of nuclear plants in this country would be withdrawn, and also said that he would welcome foreign assistance in building a 100-megawatt nuclear power plant here.

The American administration is not unaware of Pakistan's desperate need for adequate energy not only to give a push to the growth of its industrial sector but also to electrify its rural areas to improve the living conditions of village folk still putting up with a primitive way of life. The country is faced with the challenging task of having to produce 30,000 mws of electricity by the end of the century or remain plunged for ever in economic backwardness. With its fossil fuels being rapidly depleted, the expectancy of its gas deposits now likely to last no more than 20 years, the hectic, exploration for oil having met with scant success and the escalating prices of imported oil being an insufferable drain on its economy, the country is left with no other option than to recline on the development of nuclear energy. KANUPP [Karachi Nuclear Power Plant] is just 85 mws of electricity to meet the needs of the sprawling city of Karachi, and the power station of Chashma is expected to produce 900 mws for some saving to be effected in the heavy oil bill we have to pay. Pakistan thus has every justification to pin its hopes on nuclear energy.

America knows that his country's nuclear plants are subject to periodic checks by representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency and that our installations have always been found to conform to the requirements of prescribed safeguards. Pakistan has long been pressing for the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia which it would not have done if it had any

designs to fabricate atomic weapons. Islamabad has repeatedly assured the world that it has no plan whatsoever to produce an atomic bomb either for itself or for any other country. And yet the U.S. has all along been not only apathetic to our needs but also thrown a spanner into the works whenever we tried to augment our efforts to exploit nuclear energy. It was America under the Carter regime that pressured France to retract from its commitment to sell a reprocessing plant to this country. And now there is the cry for the imposition of stricter nuclear safeguards on this country's installations.

Pakistan's firm decision to resist American pressure for the acceptance of safeguards not applicable to other countries with a nuclear potential is a principled stand on which no compromise can be made. Refusal to bow to coercion, which is manifestly discriminatory and unfair, is a step to vindicate the country's honour. It is bound to be applauded at home and appreciated in circles abroad where invidious distinctions are looked upon with disfavour and principles are upheld. We sincerely hope that the Reagan administration would realise that Pakistan refuses to be knuckled under and taken for granted.

CSO: 5100/4311

## BRIEFS

URANIUM RESERVE FIGURES--Francisco Vizcaino Murray, director of URAMEX, Mexican Uranium, predicted yesterday that in order to clear away the storm clouds in the immediate future, "the International Monetary Fund will help and we will join GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs, Customs and Trade." He also said that although at present Mexico is not producing uranium, the organization he heads has located 15,000 tons of it and he added that "we have a potential of up to 500,000 tons, enough to produce electric power equivalent to 90 million tons of crude oil." He said that the Laguna Verde project will go into operation "toward year's end 1983-84." Before the ceremony, at which he received the Great Order of National Honor for Merit in Public Administration awarded by the Mexican Academy of Political Science, Vizcaino Murray granted an interview in which he explained that the rumor that 50 tons of uranium are missing is false since this mineral, produced during previous administrations, was sent to Spain for refining to a purity of 99.4 percent. Now Mexico will decide whether or not to send it to a French company, with which it has already signed an agreement, for enrichment and later use at Laguna Verde. /Article by Rosa Rojas/ /Excerpt/ /Mexico City UNOMASUNO in Spanish 28 Oct 82 p 11/ 9204

CSO: 5100/2008

## FRENCH NUCLEAR PLANT SALE CONTEMPLATED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 20 Oct 82 p 6

[Text]

The French government is considering the sale to South Africa of a second nuclear power plant. The Koeberg complex, built by a consortium composed of *Framatome*, *Alsthom* and *Spiratignolles*, will start production at the end of the year, using French-made nuclear fuel (AC Vol 23 No 1). Since France's own nuclear programme is likely to be cut and export markets are extremely limited, the French still apparently perceive South Africa as a good potential client. The government commissioned two studies from the ministry of economy and finance on the economic and political risk involved in such a deal, which would be worth about FF15bn (\$2.1bn) and 6,000 jobs for the hard-pressed French economy. According to one of the two reports, a second Franco-South African nuclear agreement would make South Africa the number one risk in the world at the end of the 1980s for the export guarantee organisation, COFACE. A second nuclear power plant sale would increase its exposure to South Africa from FF15.9bn to FF27.30bn. The French would also probably have to agree to provide the nuclear fuel needed for its operation.

Senior French government and *Parti Socialiste* officials are seriously divided over the wisdom of going ahead with the proposed sale. In its favour is the employers' association, the CNPF; the nuclear lobby around *Framatome*; Jean-Pierre Chevenement, minister of industry and research, and Michel Jobert, minister of foreign trade. Against it are Claude Cheysson, minister of external affairs; Jean-Pierre Cot, minister of cooperation and development; Lionel Jospin, first secretary of the *Parti Socialiste*, and nearly all the latter's Africanists (AC Vol 23 No 18). We understand that the final decision, to be taken before the end of the year, will be made at the Elysee Palace.

A green light for the sale would clearly damage French diplomatic and commercial initiatives in Africa, and would also probably scupper the French-backed attempt of the *Socialist International* to weave new ties with the front line states (AC Vol 23 No 14). There is therefore some pressure on *Alsthom* to stick to selling South Africa two coal-fired power plants. Profits would be less, but it would avoid a major diplomatic imbroglio. In any case, French exports towards South Africa are still booming, growing by 50% in 1981 and probably a more modest 20-25% this year to FF7bn.

Another dispute over southern African policy pits Cheysson against Jobert over the naming of a commercial attaché to the bantustan of Bophutatswana. It reflects the absence of coordination among French ministers over initiatives in southern Africa. The ambiguous nature of French policy in the region does not trouble Jean-Baptiste Doumang (AC Vol 23 No 4). With the background help of aides to communist ministers such as Jack Ralite, minister of health, and Charles Fieserman, minister of transport, he has concluded a growing number of deals. His firm, *Inter-Agra*, has just won a lucrative contract for grain silos in Zimbabwe, and more are reportedly in the pipeline •

## REPROCESSING PLANT IN LOWER SAXONY PLANNED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 8 Nov 82 p 39

[Text] Lower Saxony's Prime Minister Ernst Albrecht, who felt that a nuclear reprocessing plant in Gorleben was "not politically passable," now wants to have a nuclear factory built in the Land after all.

The political announcement appeared in the classified section. On page 20 of the ELBE-JEETZEL-ZEITUNG of Monday last week, the "Luechow-Dannenberg Citizens' Initiative for Environmental Protection" supplied information in an advertisement about what Lower Saxony's Prime Minister Ernst Albrecht (CDU) is planning "in violation of all his promises."

Between advertisements for evergreen privet and children's quilted jackets, the citizens initiative took a quarter-page to announce a special offer from the government leader, which he had already withdrawn from circulation once already: a reprocessing plant for burned-out fuel rods from nuclear power plants--not, as Albrecht had already rejected, in Gorleben, but right next door, in Dragahn, 26 kms away as the crow flies.

The information was correct. On the same Monday on which the advertisement appeared, Albrecht received a group of communal politicians from Luechow-Dannenberg district at home in Beinhorn near Hannover to inform them of his new course. On the following day he made it clear to the cabinet of Lower Saxony that saying "no" to reprocessing had applied only to Gorleben.

With that, the previous plan to build a "nuclear disposal center" in the border district on the Elbe is up for discussion again with only minor changes: Concentrated in one place, at that time Gorleben, nuclear waste from the power plants was to be put partly in final storage below ground in a salt mine, partly in temporary storage in a factory above the salt mine and then reprocessed for further industrial use.

The project divided West Germans. There were members of parliament in Bonn who believed Gorleben would "change our democracy." Civilian protesters predicted "the severest shocks of the postwar period for the FRG." Tens of thousands made the trek from Luechow-Dannenberg to Hannover shouting: "Albrecht, we're coming."

It was also clear to the prime minister that Gorleben meant a new technical dimension with numerous risks: "Decisions like these, which influence the fate of future generations, have never before been made by mankind."

When Albrecht had to make his decision about Gorleben in mid-May 1979, he considered a nuclear disposal center to be "basically possible from the point of view of technical safety." But he recognized: "As long it has not been possible to convince a broad stratum of the population of the necessity and the technical feasibility of the plant's safety, the political conditions for the construction of a reprocessing plant . . . are not there." He formulated it more succinctly to his cabinet ministers: "I do not want a civil war in the Land."

Since then, disposal, without which the nuclear cycle is stopped, has existed only on paper. The Gorleben salt mine has been tested until now and will be tested for years concerning its suitability as a final storage site. Construction is under way, also in Gorleben, to build a temporary storage site in which burned fuel rods are to be stored eventually. But whether and when these plants can be used is still not decided.

Albrecht's "no" to reprocessing thwarted principally the industry's plans to bring about the planned next phase of energy production through reprocessing as soon as possible: Plutonium, which is produced in reprocessing, is to heat the "quick breeder," which, the operators calculate, will finally turn the big profit.

The "German Company for the Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuel Rods" (DWK), a foundation of the 12 biggest West German electricity producers, which had wanted to reprocess 1,400 tons of uranium in the form of fuel rods annually in Gorleben, had to find other locations after Albrecht's decision.

At the same time the DWK reduced its ideas concerning volume. Instead of plants for 1,400 tons, it planned them for 350 tons and looked for construction sites across the entire country: In Wackersdorf in Bavaria, in Frankenberg in Hessen and in Kaisersech in the Rhineland-Palatinate.

But the DWK made no headway except in Bavaria and consequently informed Albrecht in a letter that it was still interested in the construction of a plant in Lower Saxony.

On 22 June this year, the Christian Democrat picked up the topic in the Landtag in Hannover. He wove into his government statement that the cabinet of Lower Saxony was "prepared to accept and examine suitable proposals, but not for the Gorleben location."

But it was permissible in the Luechow-Dannenberg district, where Gorleben lies. Chief district director Klaus Poggendorf (CDU) reminded the prime minister in writing and "personally," "that the district Kreistag has not spoken out in the past against a reprocessing plant. The district is open in this question and is ready for discussions."

In the conversation at Albrecht's home the only question was about the location. Dragahn in the Elbufer-Drawehn nature park, 13 houses, 35 inhabitants, less than

1/2 hour by car from Gorleben, seemed to be made for the project: A large land area belongs to the Federal government, and the natives have been accustomed to danger for years--"Delaboriergesellschaft mbH Kaus & Steinhausen" has been defusing ammunition from the Bundeswehr there for years.

Apparently Albrecht is not concerned about the not so minor difference between powder and plutonium. It also does not trouble him that he described the Gorleben location 3 years ago as "politically not passable," but now considers the neighboring location of Dragahn as acceptable. He thinks, "Gorleben would be politically passable now. But I once said: Not Gorleben."

The prime minister of Lower Saxony said to SPIEGEL: "The situation has changed. The majority of the people are now in favor of it."

9581

CSO: 5100/2520

RWE'S ROLE IN FINANCING OF SUPERPHENIX REVEALED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 22 Nov 82 pp 71, 76

/Text/ The customers of the Rheinisch-Westfaelische Elektrizitaetswerke (RWE) are indirectly paying for the construction of French nuclear bombs.

French President Mitterand endeavored to dispel all doubt. On the occasion of his latest visit to Bonn the supreme Frenchman proclaimed: "There has been no mention of any link between the FRG and France's nuclear strategy."

Indeed no such mention was necessary. The Germans are already well on the way of helping their French neighbors with the construction of future nuclear bombs.

Sixty kilometers east of Lyon, in the once idyllic little town Creys-Malville, French technicians--helped by Germans--constructed the basis of their future nuclear defense force: In addition to electricity the largest fast breeder in the world, designated by the name "Superphenix," will supply the French with plentiful and cheap plutonium from 1984 on. This will be quite enough to meet all military requirements.

Germans are contributing a great deal of money, ironically via the semi-nationalized Rheinisch-Westfaelische Elektrizitaetswerk (RWE) of Essen.

For more than 10 years this largest European electricity company has held more than two thirds of the stock of Schnell-Brueter-Kernkraftwerksgesellschaft mbH (SBK) /Fast Breeder Nuclear Power Plant Company with Limited Liability/, also of Essen.

A Dutch, a Belgian and an English firm also hold stock in the publicity-shy company. It was initially intended to be the contractor for the Kalkar fast breeder. As a matter of precaution, participation in similar enterprises was included in the SBK statutes.

When, in 1977, the French crowned their large nuclear program with the start of construction of the Superphenix at the upper end of the Rhone, the RWE managers did not act coy. The Kalkar firm they dominate took a 16 percent share in the giant concrete colossus. The remaining finance was provided by Italians and--holding the majority of the stock--the state controlled Electricite de France (EDF).

In contrast to the Germans whose progress with the breeders was delayed by many government imposed precautions, the French went ahead with the Superphenix construction without any obstruction. While the Kalkar breeder has been under construction for 10 years and is still unfinished, almost everything is proceeding according to plan with regard to Superphenix: Despite a significant disruption at the precursor model Phenix, in Marcoule near Avignon, the large-scale breeder is set to produce electricity in 1984.

Still, electricity is no more than a byproduct of the nuclear plant. According to estimates by nuclear experts it will take at least 50 years before fast breeders will be able to supply electricity at competitive prices. Far more important to the French is the weapon-class plutonium produced by Superphenix.

At the present time French nuclear weapons are produced from the plutonium yielded by two reactors in Marcoule. Much to the chagrin of French nuclear strategists, these plants are obsolete and do not manufacture enough plutonium to satisfy the demand for major tactical nuclear power.

The French will soon be rid of these anxieties when Superphenix goes onstream, with the financial assistance of the Germans. The technical journal ENERGIES, enjoying the confidence of EDF, describes the situation as follows: The advanced breeder will be able to produce sufficient plutonium for France "to construct around 60 tactical nuclear bombs per annum."

Military technicians require about 5 kg plutonium per bomb. According to cautious estimates the reactor will breed 300 kg annually. ENERGIES concludes with amazing frankness, "Superphenix will evidently be the technological basis of French nuclear power."

This great goal is being achieved with the aid of Federal German electricity customers. Experts estimate that RWE has by now sunk about DM1 billion in the giant reactor. Indirectly every RWE customer participates in financing it.

It has long been a French custom for private electricity consumers to pay for the build-up of the force de frappe. However, so far RWE managers have kept from their customers the knowledge that West German electricity customers also help pay for France's future nuclear bomb production.

Only a few months ago, when former Research Minister Andreas von Buelow called on industry to help finance Kalkar, RWE executive board member Franz-Joseph Spalthoff calmed the fears of customers and stockholders: It could not possibly be "up to the electricity industry to carry on such long-range technological developments."

Spalthoff obviously considers the situation to be different in France where the nuclear lobby advances relentlessly.

In October last the French scientific review SCIENCE ET VIE published a long report on the fruitful cooperation between electricity corporations and the military in nuclear politics.

The review quoted French General Jean Thiry who waxed enthusiastic about "large quantities of nuclear weapons at comparatively low cost" to be expected once Superphenix operates properly.

The article, now circulating among Bonn deputies, enraged SPD parliamentarians such as Wolf-Michael Catenhusen (Muenster): "The fast breeder program demonstrates that the separation between military and civilian use is merely artificial."

Catenhusen and his friends consider evident that the Germans should as rapidly as possible withdraw from the joint fast breeder program with the French. After all, says Catenhusen, up to now there has always been a political consensus that "our country may not become a nuclear weapons state."

Still, since the change-over in Bonn, the situation has been far from clear-cut.

When, the week before last, SPD parliamentarians plied the new government with questions about the joint nuclear projects, the Bonn Government answered weakly: "Cooperation in the nuclear weapons program of a nuclear weapons state," squirmed CDU State Minister for Foreign Affairs Alois Mertes, would not be permitted the FRG if such cooperation were to establish the power of disposal of such weapons."

Surely we are thus meant to understand that, as long as only the others press the button, Germans may well join in the construction of nuclear bombs.

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CSO: 5100/2530

## STUDY READIED ON FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN COUNTRY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Nov 82 p 24

[Article by Risto Valkeapaa]

[Text] Both the Industrial Power Company (TVO) and the Imatra Power Company (IVO) have prepared all those reports which it was originally thought would be necessary as a basis for the next major power plant project.

In terms of all calculations, nuclear power has proven itself to be number one. According to the original timetable, the matter should have been thrown open to principled debate in the Council of State this fall. Now, however, things have become more complicated while awaiting the parliamentary elections. The report on basic power plant alternatives is still sitting on the desks of IVO engineers decorated with their handwritten comments.

The director who is supervising the report, Dr of Technology Anders Palmgren, said that it will probably be issued to the Commerce and Industry Ministry in parts in the order in which it is completed.

According to Palmgren, at present the national economy aspect of nuclear power is still being studied more closely. Still to be studied in greater detail are environmental questions and the availability of fuel. Its public acceptability is also being thoroughly looked into. A social psychology study ordered by the IVO in connection with this will be published in a few weeks time.

In it factors relating to how people feel about the risks involved in the different power plant alternatives will be reported on. The knowledge, beliefs and set of values behind attitudes toward energy will also be reported on.

The IVO and the TVO are looking into the major power plant project as it concerns nuclear power on a cooperative basis. Despite the vagueness of the whole business, the cooperative effort and the clearest aspects of the project are effectively progressing while maintaining a low profile. Both the IVO and the TVO still fully agree that nuclear power is the best alternative for Finland's energy production.

While the national economy and social psychology have more and more begun to interest energy technology experts, at the same time they are with ever greater interest also following the division of opinions for and against nuclear power inside the political parties.

#### **"The Green and the Black"**

The Finnish Environmental Protection League has also announced that it intends to divide political parties into green and black parties. One determining factor in dividing them up will be the position they adopt on the building of a fifth nuclear power plant.

In the opinion of Dr of Technology Anders Palmgren, nuclear power should not be exploited as a symbol of values. "It is, for example, significantly easier on the environment than coal power. Fortunately, the Environmental Protection League apparently opposes the production of energy by all other means as well."

Throughout the entire short historical period of Finnish nuclear power, the IVO has been concerned over a situation in which nuclear power would become a political football. Recent newspaper articles have increased this concern.

At the present time the power company is considering what to do or whether anything ought to be done to defend nuclear power before the final report on a major power plant is completed.

Everything would be cleared up if people believed in nuclear power as profoundly as the industry's engineers do.

This faith is based on simple arithmetic, which shows that the price of nuclear power is 13.5 pennies a kilowatt hour, 18.7 pennies for coal power, including the cost of removing the sulphur, and 23.3 pennies for peat power.

As for the opponents of nuclear power, they say that the cost of storing and ultimately depositing nuclear waste products cannot be taken into account in these calculations.

The storing of nuclear waste is viewed as a problem throughout the world. In Finland it primarily involves the TVO, although the company does not concede that the matter is a technical problem. The TVO will in any event have to solve the problem of handling the waste products of its fuel at some time or other by depositing spent fuel in the bedrock of Finland. This will cost money too. The IVO can shift its problem to the other side of the eastern border.

The great principled debate over nuclear waste will probably not acquire a solid foundation here in Finland if a Soviet nuclear power plant is in the future as well in our situation considered to be more realistic than, for example, a French plant. If we end up with the French alternative, in accordance with the present state of negotiations, nuclear fuel waste products would in the final analysis remain in Finland.

Nor can we forget the waste produced by power plants. Waste products with average and low levels of radioactivity produced during operation will have to be stored in Finland in terms of all nuclear power alternatives. The most radioactive of these will remain hazardous for the environment for as much as 500 years. In terms of the handling of waste as a whole, however, in the opinion of the experts, the storing of waste with average and low levels of radioactivity represents a very small problem.

The Forsmark incident, however, has given us a foretaste of the potential problems involved in the storage of power plant waste. The waste storage facility that was planned near Forsmark was opposed by everyone up to and including Aland. Waste storage has not yet at least given rise to any significant opposition in Loviisa and Olkiluoto.

In addition to the difficulties of waste handling, another significant factor working against nuclear power may be the fitness for use of the plants. In connection with this, everything should now be in working order at the TVO. Both units were serviced last summer and they know of no new weak points. As for the IVO, they are waiting for reports on the condition of the anticorrosion layer of the pressure vessel of the Loviisa-2 reactor.

While basic power plant alternatives have been delayed, the basic issue itself, that is, the feasibility study on nuclear power plants, is being readied.

Technical feasibility studies on the French and Soviet nuclear power plants are almost ready and are locked away in IVO and TVO file cabinets as trade secrets.

In terms of size, the plants that have been studied are 930 Mw for the French plant and 1,000 Mw for the Soviet.

The present situation means the same waiting period for the plant suppliers as it does for the IVO and the TVO. Atomenergoexport (ANEX) has had a team in Helsinki averaging 15 experts. Their number is being reduced and more members of the Soviet trade delegation are expected to be added after the Finnish parliamentary elections.

As regards the nuclear power engagement between the IVO and the TVO announced for early this winter, it is just getting to be more definite all the time and acquiring stabler forms. The managers of both companies have decided to handle the study of nuclear power plant projects as a cooperative venture. At present they are looking into the practical organization of the next project.

IVO general manager Magnus von Bonsdorff's confirmation of the fact provides the effort with a firm foundation. "We firmly agree with the IVO as to how power should be structured in Finland."

Geographically speaking, the TVO and the IVO also operate in Helsinki suitably close to one another. The most important engineers of both companies occupy offices alongside Kampintori, on the corner of Malminkatu and Fredrikinkatu.

# Economic Comparison of Power Plant Alternatives

	Nuclear Plant (1,000 Mw)	Coal Plant (2 x 500 Mw)	Peat Plant (250 Mw)
Investment (billions of marks)	6	3	3.6
Total annual expenses:			
(millions of marks)	810	1,005	1,120
(pennies per kWh)	13.5	16.8	18.7
			23.3

In a comparison of basic power plant alternatives the IVO estimates the cost of electricity produced by nuclear power at 13.5 pennies per kilowatt hour. A real interest figure of 5 percent is estimated for capital in annual expenses. For the coal alternative the IVO bases its figures on the fact that sulphur-removal equipment would have to be installed if such plants are built.

11,466  
CSO: 5100/2519

**PUMP FAILURE FORCES HALT OF SOVIET-MADE NUCLEAR PLANT**

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Oct 82 p 10

[Article: "Gasket Failure Stops Loviisa Plant No. 1"]

[Text] Loviisa—The Loviisa 1 power plant, which had just undergone its annual maintenance, had to be stopped again on account of gaskets in the main circulation pump.

The gaskets were making problems for the plant already when its power was starting to be raised after annual maintenance last week. Then on Friday morning a mechanical gasket failed in one of the plant's six main circulation pumps. According to operations chief Jussi Helske, the problem was nevertheless under control at all times, and no leaks resulted. Water from the radioactive area circulates through the main circulation pumps in a nuclear power plant.

The power of Loviisa 1 started to be lowered during the morning on Friday. The plant will be stopped this afternoon. In addition to the broken gasket, the gasket in another main circulation pump will be adjusted.

According to operations chief Jussi Helske, the repair work will take about twenty-four hours. If everything goes well, Loviisa 1 will return to full power about the middle of next week.

**Annual Maintenance for Loviisa 2**

A thundering noise was heard Friday morning in the Hastholm area near Loviisa when the steam vents of the Loviisa 2 plant was tested. There are altogether 12 vents. The annual tests are taking place when winds are favorable, at a distance of 10 kilometers from Loviisa.

After the test of the steam vents, Loviisa 2 started to be turned off for annual maintenance at 9 p.m. The annual maintenance will be more thorough this year than usual, for the plant's reactor will be taken apart and the rust-preventive layer of the inner surface of its pressure vessel will be examined with a special device from West Germany.

If no sign of new defects in the inner surface of the pressure vessel of Loviisa 2's reactor is found, the plant will again be brought into operation about the beginning of the new year.

9611

CSO: 5100/2511

POSSIBLE SALE OF POWER PLANT TO SOUTH AFRICA STUDIED

Paris LIBERATION in French 15 Nov 82 p 22

[Article by Pierre Haski: "The French Government Is Divided Over the Sale of a Nuclear Power Plant to South Africa"]

[Text] J.-P. Chevenement is for, Claude Cheysson and J.-P. Cot aga nst. At stake: 4,000 jobs in Belfort and billions in contracts.

The French socialist government is considering the sale of a second nuclear power plant to South Africa. Considering the stir caused by the first French-South-African nuclear contract in 1976, and the Socialist Party's position on apartheid, such an information is so outrageous that it becomes laughable. All the same, it is quite serious and has caused considerable debate within the government.

The information was revealed by the publication of a confidential letter in London and has been confirmed from several sources in Paris. It is dynamite and could ruin the political credibility of France in Africa and create dissension within the Socialist Party.

Negotiations started a few months ago, and the question was discussed at several interministerial meetings. The government appears to be divided. The major defender of such a contract is Jean-Pierre Chevenement, minister of industry and research, who is concerned with the interests of an industrial sector suffering from cutbacks in the French nuclear power plant program. Chevenement has other, less disinterested motivations: a contract with South Africa would create 4,000 jobs, most of them... in Belfort!

Fiercely opposed to the contract, Claude Cheysson is mainly concerned by its negative political consequences. He has the support of Jean-Pierre Cot, minister of cooperation.

In the middle, Michel Jobert and Jacques Delors are undecided, but not for moral or political reasons. They just hesitate to commit themselves with South Africa in an operation that would financially tie France to Pretoria for quite a long time, until after the year 2000. Who can say what the country of apartheid will be in 20 years from now?...

No decision has been made yet and, quite probably, Francois Mitterrand himself will have to decide, probably early next year. He is said to be rather opposed to the contract.

Still, the temptation is strong considering our disastrous balance of foreign trade. In addition, in spite of its present financial difficulties, which caused it to borrow one billion dollars from the International Monetary Fund, South Africa has one of the largest power plant construction programs in the world—nuclear as well as coal power plants. In 1976, a French consortium (FRAMATOME [Franco-American Atomic Construction Company], Alsthom and SPIE [expansion unknown] Batignolles) had obtained the contract for the construction of a first nuclear power plant in Koeberg, near Cape Town, which included two 900-MW reactors. This power plant will soon be put into operation since, after 10 May 1981, the socialist government decided to fulfill all the contracts signed. It even went so far as to supply Pretoria with "nuclear fuel" for the power plant, thus short-circuiting U.S. efforts to persuade South Africa to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Since 10 May, in addition, Alsthom and the German group MAN [Augsburg-Nuernberg Machine Factory, Inc.] have obtained a contract for the construction of a giant thermal power plant.

#### South Africa Tries to Buy French Collusion

In inviting France to participate in a large investment program, the South African government—which appears to be well informed of the inner struggles of the socialist government—is trying to "buy" a long-term French "collusion." Those in the government who oppose such a contract are aware that it would make it impossible to preserve France's credibility in southern Africa where it aspires to play a part. More than any other, the nuclear sector is a sensitive one, where emotions prevail over reason. After it signed the first contract in 1976, France was called "Africa's greatest enemy" by some English-speaking African leaders. The France of Giscard had made the best of it and slowly regained ground. Would that still be possible today?

At the Socialist Party, they say (hypocritically) that they "have no knowledge of such a project," simultaneously stressing that France's action in southern Africa must be "in strict conformity with Lionel Jospin's statements at the UN conference on sanctions against South Africa, last year at UNESCO in Paris." At that time, the first secretary of the Socialist Party had unambiguously pronounced himself in favor of a "disengagement" in South Africa and for the interruption of all national companies' investments in the country of apartheid.

There is also another "battle" going on concerning South Africa and France: the tour which the French rugby team is planning to organize next spring in South Africa. The MAA [Anti-Apartheid Movement] and the MRAP [expansion unknown] are multiplying their efforts in this respect and, in an open letter to Edwige Avice, minister of sports, the MAA calls the tour "unconscionable," even "strictly from the point of view of sports." "For, in South Africa," the MAA adds, "sports, in this case rugby, obey the regulations and traditions of the racist apartheid system." The MAA also calls the tour planned

by the French Federation of Rugby a "collusion of French sports with racism," and asks Mrs Avice: "Will your ministry, too, condone such an operation through which France would help South Africa regain a credibility it would otherwise lack on the international scene? (...) We ask you, your ministry and the government to denounce the planned tour vigorously and unequivocally, in what should be a campaign of information and explanation that would at last enable non-racist sports officials, whom the South African government systematically prevents from going abroad, to express themselves."

In these two cases, of obviously unequal importance and consequences, the credibility of the socialist government's policy is at stake.

9294

CSO: 5100/2522

NUCLEAR SECURITY COUNCIL CHAIRMAN ON SAFETY

Madrid MERCADO in Spanish 5-11 Nov 82 pp 42-44

[Interview with Francisco Pascual, chairman of the Nuclear Security Council; date and place not specified]

[Text] Francisco Pascual, aged 61, the first chairman of the Nuclear Security Council since last year, has been faced with the most serious problem suffered by a Spanish nuclear powerplant, the controversial wearing out of the steam generator pipes at the Almaraz nuclear powerplant. In this interview, Francisco Pascual explains the Council's view on nuclear safety and the foreseeable solution for the Extremadura powerplant.

MERCADO: We would like you to explain the degree of operativeness of the Nuclear Security Council, and whether it has now received all the functions stipulated by law; because there appear to be some doubts about this.

Francisco Pascual: The Council has now received all the functions stipulated by law. Its ability to discharge them exhaustively and totally is something else because, as we have stated in the two reports that we sent to Parliament at the beginning of this year, and recently, on the first half of 1982, we do not have sufficient personnel with which to carry out all the functions. The Council has more functions than did the Nuclear Energy Board, and since it is operating virtually with the personnel given it by the Board, that shortage seems clear. This is a temporary situation that we are attempting to improve. For one thing, the Council has hired new personnel, about 30 persons; and, in February of next year, competitive exams have been called to fill as many as 100 slots for higher-level technicians and 30 for medium-level technicians, which will be part of the technical scale. We do not think that this increase will be sufficient; we have stipulated that the Council should have 175 higher-level technicians and 50 on the medium level. The problem is not a simple one, because we cannot incorporate personnel on a mass scale; since specific prior training and a certain amount of experience are required.

M: Could this shortage of personnel have entailed any major risk in the Council's overseeing tasks?

FP: No, because all of the Council's effort has been concentrated on the fundamental problems that the Council has brought up. Owing to the shortage of personnel, it has been impossible to perform all the functions or to initiate new ones; but

those affecting the safety of powerplants or other facilities have been scrupulously carried out. The shortcomings and delays have affected mainly the facilities with X-rays used for medical purposes and research and development programs, as well as causing a greater lag in the reports for the putting of facilities into operation. We are also of the opinion that we should inspect more, and perhaps be more strict about the penalties. If we have not done so, it is because we cannot. In any event, in no facility of those taken over by the Council has the level of risk increased owing to lack of personnel, that is certain.

M: Another question that has not been very well explained pertains to the possible transfer of functions from the Council to the Autonomous Communities. What is the present situation?

FP: First, we must specify that the law does not stipulate the term "transfers," but rather speaks of "assigning functions," according to the criteria established by the Council. The law says very clearly that the Council is the only authorized agency in the area of nuclear security, and that in any case it holds responsibility for the functions assigned to the Communities. To assign certain functions, we have held talks with the Catalanian Generalitat [legislative assembly], the most advanced, and with the Basque Government, although only unofficial talks took place with the latter. A task force has been formed with the Catalanian Autonomous Community, to study which functions of the Council might be assigned to the agencies of the Catalanian self-government; and, based on the complete agreements reached to date, the Catalanian Autonomous Community might take charge of the external radiological surveillance of the powerplants, the transportation of radioactive material within the Community, and some areas of inspection for radioactive facilities, including X-rays used for medical purposes. What the Council has requested, and the Catalanian authorities agree on this, is that the Autonomous Community have technical equipment and facilities with which to perform these tasks; that the personnel who take charge of them be on the same technical level as the Council's personnel; and that they work under the Council's supervision, so that there will be coordination. These are general criteria for the talks with all the Autonomous Communities.

M: The issue involving Almaraz is perhaps the most important of those which have come up in the nuclear area in Spain during recent years. We would like to know whether there was ever any danger to the population.

FP: At the Almaraz powerplant, there has been no undue danger due to the problem with the steam generators.

M: What solution will the Council adopt in the case of Almaraz? The technical proposal made by Westinghouse is the placement of diffusers. Is the CSN in agreement?

FP: We shall wait until the technical solution has been approved, and precisely. I shall explain. In the United States, Westinghouse is studying the solution, and it has submitted a proposal for a technical solution to the owners of the nuclear powerplants. The users have appointed a group of specialists to examine this solution. The users are the ones most harmed because, although there has been no danger of contamination, the cost in money of the process of wear on the pipes

is very great. In other words, the owners and the manufacturer must reach agreement first. The United States NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) is following the studies, and when the official presentation by this agency is made, following pertinent preliminary analysis, it may give the general approval or, if appropriate, it will refuse to do so. To date, the final presentation to the NRC has not been made. We, like the NRC, have information on the general proposal, but it might yet undergo some changes, not in concept, but in some details, for example, regarding assembly.

M: And the Council will also have to approve this new design.

FP: Actually, once the NRC gives its general approval, every nuclear powerplant which introduces the new design must request specific authorization for its own case. We shall not approve the specific modification for Spanish powerplants until there is, first, general approval of the new design, and, later, specific approval for a nuclear group outside of Spain. We don't want to be the first, we want to be more than sure.

M: Is there any approximation yet of dates by which Almaraz could be operating 100 percent?

FP: The first Spanish powerplant in which the technical modifications, that is, the installation of diffusers, will be made is Almaraz II. Dates? It depends on when the NRC gives general approval for the design, and there is specific approval of another foreign powerplant. The date set for submitting the proposal to the NRC is the end of November. If this date is kept, and the pertinent approval is given, the modification in Almaraz II could start in early January. When we have the initial dates, the programming will be carried out.

M: The Nuclear Security Council has been accused of running more risks than are reasonable, by keeping Almaraz in operation 50 percent.

FP: You must understand, that is not true; in this entire matter we have been following what is being done in other countries. In no country has any nuclear powerplant been allowed to stop operating because of the steam generator problem. In all of them, in each instance depending on the state of the powerplant and the measures adopted, temporary operations at different powers have been permitted. In some instances, such as that of Sweden, the authorization has been for up to 40 percent; in others, such as the American, up to 74 percent; and the Yugoslavs, between one thing and another, up to 100 percent. Ringhals IV, the Swedish powerplant following the one which suffered breakage in the pipes, has been authorized to operate at reduced power, without making changes in the steam generator. It is the Council's mission to see to it that no nuclear powerplant with an undue risk operates in Spain. Safety stands above everything. But, once the safety has been guaranteed, one cannot engage in demagoguery; because the companies and the country are losing a large amount of money.

M: It seems that there should have been more stringent control over the suppliers of nuclear technology, to prevent such problems.

FP: In the case of Spain, we cannot go into that. We operate with the criterion known as "central reference," whereby we require that the design of a nuclear group be approved in its country of origin, and that the same technical conditions which prevail in that country be the ones prevailing here. I should remind you that no radioactive damage has occurred, either here or abroad, and that the technical specifications for a nuclear powerplant include stringent control to foresee the breakage of pipes. I emphasize that the fundamental damage is economic.

M: The Zorita nuclear powerplant has been shut down to undertake improvements. How long will it be halted?

FP: According to the Council's directives, it has been shut down to make improvements in the safety. The minimal stoppage will be for 6 months, although I have the impression that it will most likely be for 8. The investments required for the improvements are very large, probably similar to the total cost of the powerplant.

M: Another unclear matter is the Emergency Plan for Lemoniz. What is the Council's position in this regard?

FP: The Lemoniz Emergency Plan is not within the Council's jurisdiction, although the establishment of the radiological criteria for the plan, which we have already devised, is. Once it has been prepared by the competent authorities, the Council will participate in its final approval. We shall ascertain whether the specifications in the radiological area have been met. The approval is up to the Civil Protection authorities. In short, when the plan is submitted to us, we shall issue our report. Now then, I would stress that Lemoniz will not be permitted to operate until the plan has been approved.

M: A report was recently published by a German agency on the Asco nuclear powerplant, which noted certain catastrophic consequences for the area. What is your opinion of it?

FP: The only thing I can say is that, when we have the report, we shall analyze it, and we are willing to respond. A few days after it was made public, on 4 or 5 October, I sent a letter to the mayor of Asco, asking him to send us the report, but he has not sent it to us. We have made our own studies and, on the basis of this, we are authorizing the construction and putting into service. In brief, this will happen when we have the report; until we have that report, we cannot judge it.

M: How many radioactive leaks has the Nuclear Security Council counted in Spain?

FP: All the radioactive fallout that has occurred in nuclear facilities is included in our reports to the Congress. In no instance has there been any leak exceeding the limits.

M: The Council has often been accused of a lack of neutrality, of accommodating to the pressure from the Ministry of Industry and the electric companies, and of a certain amount of collusion between Council members and business firms in the sector. What do you have to say in this connection?

FP: I disagree completely with those charges. It seems to me that these are views that might be held by persons who are not familiar with the Council. I can assure you that the Council has at all times acted in a completely and absolutely neutral manner. At all times, the decisions that have been made have received favorable technical reports, and were made in conscience. Naturally, it is always possible for a particular problem to be solved in one direction or another; but the Council has always acted on the basis of the reports from its technical staff and the analysis of its members. None of the Council members is connected with the electric companies, and their careers have generally taken place far removed from them. Most of their activity has been in government service.

M: Do you think that a socialist government will change the Council's criteria for action?

FP: I sincerely believe that the law, in its current wording, gives the Council political contingencies, and makes it possible to guarantee to the maximum extent the nuclear safety and radiological protection of the powerplants. And, furthermore, I believe that the work done by the Council has been totally constructive in this area. This is the path, with these individuals or with others, for enabling the nuclear powerplants to operate without undue risk.

2909

CSO: 5100/2529

# NEW LEGISLATION EASES PROVISIONS FOR STARTING NUCLEAR PLANTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Nov 82 p 41

[Text] The 1977 law of conditions will be eased. It says that no new nuclear power plants may be started up until final storage is "completely safe." The new law instead demands that final storage must be safe.

This was reported on the "Environmental Magazine" radio program Tuesday night.

"Neither in a scientific nor in a moral sense is there anything that is completely safe in this human life," said Energy Minister Birgitta Dahl.

She has been a member of the Atomic Legislation Committee which was appointed in 1979 and which will shortly present the proposal for the new law.

The committee will furthermore propose that reprocessing should be permitted in the future as well.

Sweden has a controversial agreement with Cogema in France to reprocess our nuclear waste.

One of the objections to the agreement is that by reprocessing the waste plutonium is extracted which can be used for nuclear weapons. Another is that reprocessing is considerably more expensive than originally believed.

It is therefore surprising that the committee on nuclear waste is agreeing to continued reprocessing, when the opponents of reprocessing, the VPK [Left Party-Communists], Center Party and Social Democrats, could have rejected it by way of their majority on the committee.

One reason, among others, according to Birgitta Dahl, is that final storage will be safer with reprocessed nuclear waste.

11949  
CSO: 5100/2516

# ENERGY MINISTER REOPENS QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Nov 82 p 12

[Article by Ann-Charlotte Samec: "Sweden's Nuclear Waste Still an Uncertain Question"]

[Text] Energy Minister Birgitta Dahl will undertake a "thorough evaluation" of how Sweden might take care of its nuclear waste in the future. All possibilities will be reviewed. This means that it is still uncertain what will become of the nuclear waste. Should Sweden choose to take care of the waste itself, the very controversial agreement with Cogema in France must be canceled.

The new review of the agreement with Cogema comes at the very last moment. On 15 December plans are for the nuclear waste ship "Sigyn" to depart from Ringhals outside Goteborg to La Hague in France. It will then be loaded with two specially constructed containers, which together hold 12 spent fuel elements from Ringhals 2.

On Sunday the "Sigyn" will arrive at Ringhals in order to take on a test cargo of fuel element containers.

Lars Tulen, information secretary for Birgitta Dahl, emphasizes that the "thorough evaluation" of how we are to handle the nuclear waste cannot in any way be called a study.

"But the energy minister considers that because of the extreme importance of the issue it is necessary to have a thorough evaluation which provides a very comprehensive understanding of all conceivable courses of action."

"The issue will be scrutinized from technical, legal, economic and foreign-political points of view."

The actual "evaluation" will be made by officials at the Industry Ministry, but officials from other ministries will also be involved. Lawyers from the Justice Ministry will scrutinize the legal aspects.

Issues for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Where questions of foreign policy are concerned, the Foreign Ministry will be contacted.

"The analysis will give the government a complete foundation for decision-making when it has to take a position on the waste issue. The explosive nature of the issue is the reason why the government will not move a muscle until the analysis has been completed.

DAGENS NYHETER: When will it be completed?

"That will be the first task on which this group has to make a decision."

The nuclear waste issue is one of the hottest and politically most sensitive issues on which the government must take a position.

#### New Proposal

The Atomic Legislation Committee will shortly present a proposal aimed at changing one of the key wordings in the 1977 law of conditions.

It says there that no new nuclear power plants may be started up in Sweden until final storage of nuclear fuel is completely safe.

The Atomic Legislation Committee now wants to change "completely safe" to "safe."

This means that it will become easier to store the waste here at home.

The advantages of sending the waste to France is that after reprocessing there it becomes "less dangerous" to store.

The main drawback is that it is possible to make nuclear weapons from the plutonium extracted from the reprocessed waste.

11949

CSO: 5100/2516

SWEDEN

# NUCLEAR AGENCY CHARGES PLANT ERRED IN OPERATING WITH FAULT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Nov 82 p 10

Text Ringhals 4 operated for 11 days in violation of the safety regulations. This is a more serious error from a strictly safety-oriented point of view than the much-publicized incident of the broken screws at Forsmark 2.

According to TT Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, this is the conclusion of the State Nuclear Inspection Agency (SKI) in its report on incidents at the nuclear power plants during the second quarter this year. Six rapid shutdowns occurred at the 10 reactors in operation during the period. Four of them affected Oskarshamn 1 during startup after the fire in the turbine. Two rapid shutdowns took place at Ringhals 3.

On 14 April Ringhals 4 was given permission by the SKI to begin experimental operation. The entire core was in place on 18 April. During a test on 15 May it was discovered that two isolation valves in the boron injection system could not be opened. Boron is essential for controlling the nuclear fission process in the reactor.

According to existing safety regulations the valves must be ready for operation. The reactor must otherwise be shut down within 24 hours. Ringhals 4 operated for 11 days in violation of the regulations before the discovery was made, the SKI points out. The surveillance routines have now been examined and supplemented.

The faulty screws at Forsmark 2 were discovered on 8 May. At that time a fuel rod which was to be picked out of the core got stuck. This was due to a faulty screw which projected into the guide rail which holds the fuel rod in place. When all of the screws had been checked, it was determined that 240 out of the 700 screws had cracks in them. The same fault was discovered at Forsmark 1.

The Asea-Atom fuel plant had two disturbances worth reporting during the period, in the opinion of the SKI. Both incidents were due to carelessness.

During a night shift the personnel dismantled the devices intended to keep the containers of uranium pellets at the proper distance from each other. The incident is serious, the SKI maintains, since this happened in violation of approved instructions. In the second case uranium-containing water leaked out into portions of the compressed air system. This was because a valve had been left open.

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CSO: 5100/2516

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